Biblio
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1984. Allocation des coûts et formation des coalitions: une approche par la théorie des jeux. Economics. Ph.D.
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1986. Allocating Joint Costs by Means of the Nucleolus. International Journal of Game Theory. 152:109-119. Abstract
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1987. Computation of the Nucleolus of Some Bilateral Market Games. International Journal of Game Theory. 16:1-14. Abstract
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1987. Disadvantageous Syndicates and Stable Cartels: the Case of the Nucleolus. Journal of Economic Theory. 42:30-49. Abstract
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1989. Efficiency and Stability in Partnerships. Social Sciences. Ph.D. Abstract
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1990. Strongly Durable Allocations. Abstract
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1991. Efficiency in Partnerships. Journal of Economic Theory. 55:296-322. Abstract
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1993. Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships. The Review of Economic Studies. 60:599-611. Abstract
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1993. Information Revelation and Repeated Delegation. Games and Economic Behavior. 5:98-117. Abstract
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1995. Bankruptcy as a Control Device in Economies in Transition. Journal of Comparative Economics. 20:265-301. Abstract
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1996. Wealth Effects, Distribution, and the Theory of Organization. Journal of Economic Theory. 70:312-341. Abstract
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2000. Mergers in Emerging Markets with Network Externalities: the Case of Telecoms. Le nouveau modèle européen. 2
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2001. Segregation, Efficiency and Equity. The Strategic analysis of universities: microeconomic and management perspectives
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2002. Adverse Selection and Contracts: a Discussion. The Eight World Congress of the Econometric Society. Abstract
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2002. Courts, Contracts and Interference. European Economic Review. 46:734-744. Abstract
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2002. Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds. The Review of Economic Studies. 69:925-942. Abstract
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2003. Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics. Journal of the European Economic Association. 1 Abstract
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2003. Auction House Settlements - Winning Twice? The Art Newspaper.
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2004. Quality Incentives in Network Industries: a Case Study and a Model. La Grande Europe. Abstract
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2004. Auditing and Property Rights. Rand Journal of Economics. 35:356-372. Abstract
