| Title | Managerial Firms, Organizational Choice and Consumer Welfare |
| Publication Type | Working Paper |
| Author | Legros P, Newman A |
| Year of Publication | 2004 |
| Keywords | competition policy, integration, ownership, partnerships, price theory, vertical integration |
| Place Published | Institute for Advanced Studies |
| Number | DP 37 |
| Abstract | We show that vertical integration decisions of managers may affect adversely consumers even in the absence of monopoly power in either supply or product markets. This effect is most likely to come about when demand is initially high and there is a negative supply shock or when demand is low and there is a positive demand shock. The results are robust to the introduction of active shareholders and to other extensions. |
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| Citation Key | 100 |
